Part One of Digital Assets as Financial Infrastructure, a three-part series examining how policy, programmable money, and agentic commerce are reshaping financial infrastructure.
Digital assets are moving beyond their origins as a speculative asset class and into the infrastructure of payments, treasury and settlement. This first article examines the policy foundations enabling that shift—and why programmable finance is becoming part of national economic infrastructure.
Programmable finance has moved from a regulatory question to an instrument of economic strategy
For most of crypto’s history, regulation was framed as a perimeter problem: how to contain a volatile and sometimes illicit market without giving it institutional legitimacy. That framing no longer fits. Stablecoins, tokenized deposits, tokenized Treasury products, and programmable payment systems now directly affect the reach of the dollar, demand for U.S. government debt, the competitiveness of regulated institutions, and the standards that will govern software-mediated commerce.
The important policy change is not that government has endorsed every crypto product. It has not. The change is that the United States now treats selected digital-asset infrastructure as something to shape and use, not merely police from a distance. That shift changes investment incentives. It gives banks, payment networks, issuers, and software platforms a clearer basis on which to commit capital, integrate products, and compete for the balances that will move through the next financial stack.
From regulatory ambiguity to a build mandate
The shift came in a sequence. The January 2025 executive order on digital financial technology made U.S. leadership, lawful dollar-backed stablecoins, open networks, and regulatory clarity explicit policy objectives.1 In March and April 2025, the federal banking agencies removed or clarified prior processes that had discouraged otherwise permissible crypto and stablecoin activity. The OCC reaffirmed that national banks could engage in specified crypto-asset and stablecoin activities; the FDIC ended its prior-approval requirement for permissible activities; and the Federal Reserve withdrew its advance-notice and dollar-token nonobjection processes.2
The GENIUS Act then supplied a federal framework for payment stablecoins, including reserve, redemption, disclosure, anti-money-laundering, and supervisory requirements.3 That framework matters because a redeemable payment instrument cannot scale on technology alone. Users, banks, merchants, and intermediaries need to know who may issue it, what backs it, how it can be redeemed, and which entity is accountable when the system fails.
September 2026 sharpened the distinction between policy direction and legislative completion into focus. On September 15, the Senate failed to advance the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act, leaving the proposed broader framework for digital-asset markets unresolved.4 The GENIUS Act’s enacted framework for payment stablecoins remains a separate foundation. For institutions, the distinction is consequential: clearer pathways for issuing and using digital dollars can support investment even while Congress continues to contest the rules governing the wider digital-asset market.
Even as the broader legislative framework remains unsettled, commercial deployment is advancing on its own timetable. The following day, Circle launched Arc’s public mainnet, a blockchain built for financial markets, payments, and agentic economic activity.5 The juxtaposition captures the transition now underway: legislative negotiations continue while firms put new financial infrastructure into operation. The strategic question increasingly concerns who will build, govern, and connect these systems as their use expands.
The enacted stablecoin framework and banking-agency changes establish clearer pathways for specific financial activities, giving institutions a firmer basis for investment and product development. A bank can assess whether to provide custody, settlement, reserves, or tokenized-deposit services. A payment company can build an integration without assuming the entire category will remain legally indeterminate. A software platform can decide where a stablecoin belongs within its product rather than treating it as a separate crypto experiment.
The U.S. vision is now explicitly strategic
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent made that strategic shift explicit in June 2026. He placed digital assets, stablecoins, tokenization, and new payment systems within a broader vision of American economic statecraft—one focused on strengthening the dollar, improving efficiency and access, and preserving transparency, security, consumer protection, and law-enforcement capability.6
Mohamed A. El-Erian’s subsequent New York Times essay helps explain why that speech matters beyond crypto. He describes a broader shift away from economic policy organized chiefly around efficiency and toward a system in which resilience, national capacity, reciprocal access, emerging-technology standards, and geopolitical leverage play larger roles.7 On this reading, payment and settlement infrastructure is not neutral plumbing. It is part of the machinery through which a country projects monetary and technological influence.
Exhibit 1: Policy has become strategic financial infrastructure
The policy progression is cumulative: clearer rules create buildable pathways; products and protocols test those pathways; strategic framing raises the stakes. Sources are identified in the accompanying footnote.8
Regulation is no longer only a parameter. It is an input into products, standards, reserve demand, and dollar distribution.
The dollar-and-collateral channel is already measurable
The strategic case is already measurable. Dollar-backed stablecoin issuers have become material buyers of short-term government securities. A revised 2026 Bank for International Settlements working paper estimates that the seven largest dollar-backed stablecoins held approximately $153 billion of Treasury bills at the end of 2025 and purchased about $33 billion during the year.9 Those holdings were large enough to place the sector alongside major foreign and domestic investors in the bill market.
The same paper identifies a measurable price channel. Using daily data through March 2026 and an instrumental-variable design, the authors estimate that a $3.5 billion stablecoin inflow lowers the three-month Treasury-bill yield by approximately 0.71 basis points on impact and by about four basis points within ten days. The effect is concentrated at short maturities and grows when Treasury-market intermediation is stressed.10 That does not make stablecoins a dominant driver of Treasury pricing. It does, however, establish that the connection between digital-dollar demand and public debt markets has moved from theory into observable market behavior.
This creates a reinforcing loop. Wider stablecoin use can increase demand for reserve assets. A deep market in high-quality dollar assets makes credible reserves and redemption more feasible. Tokenized Treasury and money-market products can then serve as yield-bearing treasury balances or collateral alongside the payment instrument. The dollar’s role is extended not because users hold a conventional banknote, but because software-native balances remain denominated in dollars and backed by dollar assets.
Concentration makes the opportunity consequential and the risk real. The BIS study reports that the top three stablecoin-chain pairs accounted for roughly 80 percent of sector market capitalization in its sample, and the top ten for about 95 percent.11 A small number of issuers, chains, reserve managers, custodians, and banking relationships therefore sit at points of significant operational and liquidity risk.
The competition is functional, not ideological
The familiar framing—banks versus stablecoins—obscures the market that is actually forming. Different instruments can compete for different balances inside the same operating stack:
- Payment stablecoins can compete for transaction balances, cross-border working capital, marketplace settlement, and machine-to-machine payments.
- Tokenized bank deposits can preserve a claim on a regulated bank while adding programmable movement and ledger integration.
- Tokenized Treasury and money-market products can compete for treasury balances, yield-bearing liquidity, and collateral.
- Traditional deposits remain central to insured operating cash, relationship banking, and credit creation.
This functional view is more useful because the value at stake extends beyond transaction fees. The rail carrying the balance can shape where reserves are invested, who controls the customer interface, which institution sees the transaction data, what compliance rules are embedded, and which technical standard becomes easiest for agents and merchants to adopt. A payment instrument can therefore strengthen a currency’s distribution even when it is issued by a private firm.
The likely endpoint is not a clean victory for one category. It is a hybrid stack in which regulated issuers, banks, asset managers, payment networks, custodians, public and private ledgers, stablecoins, tokenized deposits, and tokenized funds interoperate. The competition will be over which instrument performs each function most effectively and which institutions control the surrounding data, identity, and distribution.
Openness, resilience, and fragmentation
Strategic support raises the standard of performance. A system cannot become reliable merely by representing assets as tokens. Legal ownership, custody, bankruptcy treatment, redemption, transfer restrictions, compliance, operational resilience, and interoperability remain decisive. IOSCO has warned that tokenization can introduce or amplify legal, operational, counterparty, and interconnectedness risks even when it reduces other frictions.12
There is also a geopolitical risk of fragmentation. If competing jurisdictions embed different identity rules, reserve requirements, sanctions capabilities, or technical standards, global finance may become more programmable but less seamless. Private ledgers, public chains, bank-operated networks, and payment protocols may all expand without becoming fully interoperable. In that environment, standards are a source of leverage: the entity that defines the accepted credential, mandate, settlement asset, or compliance message can shape who participates and on what terms.
That is why the regulatory opening belongs at the start of this series. It is the foundation on which commercial adoption now rests. The next question is whether firms are actually using that foundation to change financial workflows—not simply issuing announcements or proofs of concept. The evidence is increasingly visible in payment balances, tokenized cash products, institutional platforms, and software-native settlement.
Next in the series: Part Two — The Rails Are Moving: how stablecoins and tokenized assets are becoming products for payments, treasury, liquidity, and collateral.