Licensing Agreements and the Role of Diligence
Joint research and development (R&D) collaborations are increasingly common in the modern economy because they allow firms to share the substantial costs, risks, and uncertainties associated with innovation while leveraging complementary capabilities and resources. Such collaborations can combine the scientific expertise, technological know-how, manufacturing capabilities, regulatory experience, and commercial infrastructure of different companies, enabling innovation that might otherwise be difficult or prohibitively expensive for any single firm to undertake independently. By pooling resources, firms can accelerate product development, improve the likelihood of successful innovation, and bring new products to market more efficiently.
Licensing agreements are a primary mechanism through which new technologies are further developed and commercialized.1 Collaborations are commonly observed in several industries, including biopharmaceuticals, software, semiconductors, telecommunications, and media, where firms seek to combine complementary know-how, intellectual property, and commercialization capabilities.
However, licensing arrangements carry risks to the licensor that the licensee may delay or abandon development, depriving the licensor of potential royalties and market opportunities. This risk is commonly referred to as moral hazard in economics—a situation in which the licensee may not act in the best interests of the licensor and may frustrate the economic purpose of the agreement. To mitigate this risk and promote timely development and commercialization, companies often rely on carefully structured license agreements.
This article explains how economists translate diligence clauses into an economic framework and then apply that framework using the comparable company approaches, the “hypothetical reasonable company” approach, or a combination of them when these agreements become the subject of litigation.
Why Diligence Clauses Matter
Diligence clauses are critical economic provisions in licensing agreements and M&A contracts across innovation-intensive industries, particularly where the value of a licensed, or contracted asset depends heavily on timely development and commercialization efforts. It is common for a licensor to require the licensee to use “commercially reasonable efforts,” “reasonable efforts,” or “best efforts” (collectively, “CRE”) to develop, test, obtain necessary approvals for, and commercialize the product. These clauses serve as an economic contractual safeguard that helps align incentives and reduce the likelihood of insufficient action by the licensee.
The legal meaning of terms such as “reasonable efforts,” “best efforts,” and “commercially reasonable efforts” depends on the agreement and applicable law; economists do not supply that legal interpretation. Once the operative standard is identified, however, economists can evaluate the relevant benchmark, the information available at the time, and the costs, risks, incentives, and constraints facing the decision maker.
In practice, different formulations of diligence clauses can lead to markedly different results in licensing and earnout disputes.2 For economists, these decisions illustrate how seemingly subtle differences in CRE language can materially affect the applicable benchmark and the evidence that must be evaluated. A rigorous economic analysis therefore proceeds in two steps: first, it identifies the economic benchmark implied by the operative contractual standard and, second, evaluates whether the obligated party’s conduct was consistent with that benchmark given the incentives, constraints, and costs it faced. These benchmarks are then used to assess the impact of the alleged failure to exercise CRE.
Translating the Contractual Standard into an Economic Framework
The key analytical issue is not whether the project ultimately succeeded, but what a commercially reasonable company would have done at each relevant decision point given the information, incentives, risks, and constraints available at the time. For damages, the question becomes what the economic circumstances would have been in the but-for world had CRE been exercised.
From an economic perspective, a profit-maximizing company would be expected to allocate development efforts and resources to a product when the anticipated returns justify the associated risks and costs. Accordingly, an economic benchmarking exercise should account for the information available to the decision maker at the relevant time, as well as the incentives, risks, and constraints it faced. The analysis should be ex ante rather than driven by hindsight or the project’s eventual outcome.
The appropriate economic benchmark depends on the formulation of the diligence clause. One possible benchmark is that a licensee satisfies a “best efforts” obligation if it acts in a manner that maximizes the expected value of the joint venture or licensed product, taking into account the interests of both parties. Under this view, the relevant benchmark would be the conduct of a reasonable company seeking to maximize the joint project’s overall value.
Another potential benchmark is one that requires the licensee to take actions that would maximize the licensor’s expected returns, subject to the constraint that the licensee is not required to incur material losses or act against its own economic viability. Under this framework, the benchmark may differ from simple joint-profit maximization and instead focus on whether the licensee pursued actions that would have advanced the licensor’s interests, consistent with the limits imposed by the contract. Selecting the appropriate economic benchmark therefore depends critically on the language of the agreement, the allocation of rights and responsibilities between the parties, and the specific formulation of the efforts obligation.
Applying the Economic Framework
Once the relevant economic benchmark has been identified, two analytical approaches are commonly used to apply it: a comparable company approach and a hypothetical reasonable company approach.
A comparable company approach to evaluating CRE obligations compares the efforts of the relevant party against a benchmark derived from similarly situated companies facing comparable circumstances. The benchmark may be based on either external or internal comparators.
Under an external benchmark, the inquiry focuses on whether the company’s efforts are consistent with those that similarly situated firms in the industry would ordinarily undertake to achieve comparable objectives. Under an internal benchmark, the inquiry focuses on whether the company devoted efforts and resources to the project consistent with its treatment of comparable projects within its own portfolio. This approach examines whether the company applied a similar level of commitment, staffing, funding, and managerial attention across comparable development initiatives.
A hypothetical reasonable company approach to assessing CRE obligations compares the development efforts of the party against those of a hypothetical reasonable company, where reasonableness is assessed using fundamental economic principles. Under this framework, economists may evaluate the market landscape as it existed at key decision points, to assess whether the party’s actions were consistent with those a hypothetical reasonable company would have taken. If so, the efforts may be assessed as commercially reasonable; if not, they may fall below the benchmark.
Whether a comparable company approach or a hypothetical reasonable company approach is more appropriate for evaluating diligence clauses depends on several factors, including the language of the contract, the availability of reliable comparators, the nature of the decision at issue, and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the relevant business judgment.
The comparable company approach is generally most appropriate when the contractual language contemplates an objective standard that can be assessed by reference to industry practice. In contrast, a hypothetical reasonable company approach may be more appropriate when reliable comparators are unavailable or when the decision at issue involves unique circumstances unlikely to be replicated elsewhere in the industry.
Contractual language may also influence which approach is more appropriate. Some agreements define commercially reasonable efforts by reference to what similarly situated companies would do under comparable circumstances. Such provisions naturally lend themselves to a benchmarking exercise based on industry comparators. Other agreements define CRE in terms of what a company would reasonably undertake to maximize the value of a product while considering factors such as safety, efficacy, profitability, competitive conditions, intellectual property, and regulatory considerations. These formulations often require a more holistic inquiry into the commercial reasonableness of the decision itself and may support greater reliance on a hypothetical reasonable company framework. In some cases, contractual language explicitly directs consideration of both industry practice and product-specific economic factors, suggesting that a hybrid approach may be warranted.
In practice, the two approaches are often complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Comparable-company evidence can serve as an empirical check on the results of a hypothetical reasonable company analysis, while economic modeling can help explain why observed industry behavior may or may not represent commercially reasonable conduct. Ultimately, the choice of methodology should be driven by the economic characteristics of the decision being evaluated and by the specific language and objectives of the CRE clauses at issue. Once the appropriate approach is decided upon, economists can then turn their attention to the but-for outcome and the assessment of potential damage.
- World Intellectual Property Organization. Technology Transfer Agreements, https://www.wipo.int/en/web/technology-transfer/agreements ↩︎
- The Delaware Court of Chancery’s decisions in Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Himawan v. Cephalon, Inc. illustrate this point. Despite the broadly similar facts, the outcomes differed. ↩︎
